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Abstract—This paper focuses on the secure transmission of
wireless-powered relay systems with imperfect eavesdropper
channel state information (ECSI). For efficient energy transfer
and information relaying, a novel two-phase protocol is proposed,
in which the relay operates in full-duplex (FD) mode to achieve
simultaneous wireless power and information transmission. Com-
pared with those existing protocols, the proposed design possesses
two main advantages: 1) it fully exploits the available hardware
resource (antenna element) of relay and can offer higher secrecy
rate; 2) it enables self-energy recycling (S-ER) at relay, in which
the loopback interference (LI) generated by FD operation is
harvested and reused for information relaying. To maximize the
worst-case secrecy rate (WCSR) through jointly designing the
source and relay beamformers coupled with the power allocation
ratio, an optimization problem is formulated. This formulated
problem is proved to be non-convex and the challenge to solve
it is how to concurrently solve out the beamformers and the
power allocation ratio. To cope with this difficulty, an alternative
approach is proposed by converting the original problem into
three subproblems. By solving these subproblems iteratively,
the closed form solutions of robust beamformers and power
allocation ratio for the original problem are achieved. Simulations
are done and results reveal that the proposed S-ER based secure
transmission scheme outperforms the traditional time-switching
based relaying (TSR) scheme at a maximum WCSR gain of 80%.
Results also demonstrate that the WCSR performance of the
scheme reusing idle antennas for information reception is much
better than that of schemes exploiting only one receive antenna.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, full-duplex relay, energy
harvesting, self-energy recycling, imperfect channel state infor-
mation.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE broadcast nature of wireless medium presents aformidable challenge in ensuring simultaneously secure
and reliable communications in the presence of adversaries [1].
To enhance the transmission security, physical layer security,
that achieves secrecy by exploiting the inherent randomness
of wireless channels, has been proposed recently and drawn
intensive attention [2–5]. A particularly interesting physical
layer security technology is cooperative relaying, since it can
not only combat the effect of the path loss by shortening
the access distance, but also provide extra spatial degrees of
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freedom for information transmission by coordinating with
other communication nodes. Recent studies [6–12] show that
compared with direct transmission schemes, cooperative relay-
ing can bring more than twice the secrecy rate gain. This has
made physical layer security one of the potential technologies
to protect the security of 5G wireless networks [13].
The performance of cooperative systems is based on the
amount of power of relays spent on information transmission.
Sometimes, making relay spend more power on information
relay is unrealistic. For instance, although the mobile users
can be treated as cooperative relays in cellular networks, they
may unwilling to participate in cooperative communications
because of their starving energy storage. To alleviate this,
wireless-powered strategy is proposed by making use of radio-
frequency (RF) signals emitted from other communication
nodes to provide stable energy supply for relay nodes [14–
16]. With respect to different roles of relays in secure systems,
there are two types of cooperative schemes, i.e., wireless-
powered cooperative relaying scheme and wireless-powered
cooperative jamming scheme. Specifically, with harvested en-
ergy from RF signals emitted by the source node or the
destination node, cooperative relaying schemes [17–20] utilize
multi-antenna technologies to steer information beams for
information enhancement at desired receivers and information
leakage degradation at malicious attackers. While for wireless-
powered cooperative jamming schemes [21–23], idle internal
communication nodes act as jammers, which consume the
harvested energy to transmit jamming signals confusing mali-
cious eavesdroppers. All of the aforementioned work focuses
on half-duplex (HD) relaying operation, whereas the spectral
efficiency loss from HD constraint leads to system secrecy rate
degradation.
As an attractive solution to overcome this limitation
of wireless-powered secure systems, wireless-powered full-
duplex (FD) architecture has drawn increasing attention in se-
cure systems [24–26]. In [24], a cooperative jamming scheme
was developed for friendly jammers with FD architecture,
in which jammer nodes simultaneously harvest energy and
transmit jamming signals to degrade eavesdropper channels.
Moreover, a novel time switching (TS)-based FD relaying
scheme is proposed to enable the secure communications in
wireless-powered cooperative systems [25, 26]. Relay nodes
adopt available energy harvested in the first phase to as-
sist information transmission in a FD way. Compared with
HD operation, FD capable nodes can offer an average of
33%−66% secrecy rate gain. However, the substantial secrecy
performance of FD relaying is limited by the introduced loop-
back interference (LI). Although many advanced interference-
cancellation (IC) technologies [27, 28] have been proposed
to suppress LI, implementing such technologies needs addi-
tional energy consumption and expensive hardwares. A novel
self-energy recycling (S-ER) based relaying scheme [29] is
proposed and investigated to against the negative effects of LI
[30–32]. Particularly, secure beamforming [30] and antenna as-
signment [31] schemes are exploited for S-ER based relaying
systems, in which the LI energy is recycled and reused for
information retransmission. Additionally, as an extension of
[30, 31], [32] introduced S-ER strategy into FD source nodes,
and proposed an optimal beamforming scheme for efficient
energy and confidential information transmission.
The above work on S-ER based secure systems can make
use of the energy of LI efficiently to achieve better secrecy rate
performance. However, [30–32] either focus on single antenna
transmission from source to relay or secure systems without
cooperative relays, leading to limited secrecy enhancement
of S-ER relaying schemes. More importantly, the potential
performance improvements of above work rely on the perfect
eavesdropper channel state information (ECSI), which is an
ideal assumption [33]. In general, it is prohibitively difficult
for a transmitter to obtain full ECSI, since eavesdroppers are
usually keeping silent to hide. Moreover, even eavesdroppers
feedback channel estimation results to the transmitter, due to
some practical issues such as channel estimation errors, feed-
back errors, quantization and delays, the feedback information
may be untrustworthy and exists some uncertainties [34, 35].
Such kind of uncertainties in turn lead to serious information
leakage and secrecy performance degradation.
Motivated by the aforementioned problems, this work fo-
cuses on robust secure transmission scheme design for S-
ER based wireless-powered relay systems. To facilitate S-
ER operation at relay, a two-phase FD relaying protocol is
adopted, and separate antenna configuration is considered at
the relay node. In particular, half of the time block is devoted
for information transmission from source to relay, while the
remaining time is used for concurrent information forwarding
and energy harvesting. The harvested energy from the LI
channel in addition to RF signals emitted from the source
can be stored and then used for information retransmission
in the next time block. The main objective of this work is
to investigate the effect of imperfect ECSI on the system
secrecy rate, and design robust beamformers as well as power
allocation scheme to degrade the information leakage caused
by channel uncertainty, and finally offer more secrecy rate
gain. Specifically, the main contributions of this paper can be
summarized as follows.
• A novel two-phase S-ER based secure system is estab-
lished by adopting FD mode to achieve simultaneous
information and power transmission. An antenna reuse
approach is proposed to make use of idle transmit anten-
nas for information reception to enhance the information
signal strength.
• The worst-case secrecy rate (WCSR) is introduced as the
system secrecy performance metric. To maximize WCSR,
a joint optimization problem including information beam-
former, transceiver beamformers and power allocation ra-
tio is formulated and investigated under imperfect ECSI.
• With respect to the information beamformer, the
transceiver beamformers and the power allocation ratio,
the formulated optimization problem of WCSR is non-
convex, and it is prohibitively difficult to solve due
to high computational complexity. To cope with this
difficulty and solve it efficiently, an alternative method
is proposed by converting the original problem into three
subproblems. Solving these subproblems iteratively, the
closed form solutions of the robust beamformers and the
optimal power allocation ratio maximizing WCSR are
derived.
• To demonstrate the superiority of the proposed S-ER
based secure system in terms of secrecy performance,
the WCSR optimization problem for the traditional time
switching based relaying (TSR) systems is also formu-
lated and included as a baseline. Simulations are done
and results show that the proposed S-ER based secure
systems outperform those TSR systems greatly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the system model of the proposed S-ER based secure
system and the WCSR optimization problem formulation.
Section III elaborates the proposed algorithm to find solutions
for the robust beamformers and the power allocation ratio to
maximize WCSR performance. The WCSR optimization prob-
lem for traditional TSR systems is introduced in Section IV
as a benchmark for performance comparisons. Then, Section
V simulates and analyzes the performance of the proposed S-
ER based secure system. Finally, Section VI concludes all the
paper.
Notations: The bold upper (lower) letters denote matrices
(column vectors), and (·)† denotes the conjugate transpose.
IM is the identity matrix of size M × M . E{·} denotes
expectation, and ‖ · ‖ indicates the L2 norm of a vector and
the | · | means the absolute value. [a]+ denotes max(a, 0).
And CN (0, σ2) represents a circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance σ2. CN×M
represents the N ×M complex vector space.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
Secure transmission in a wireless-powered relay system is
considered, as shown in Fig. 1. In this system, a multi-antenna
source transmits confidential signals to a single antenna desti-
nation with the help of a wireless-powered relay, while keeping
information from being intercepted by an eavesdropper1. To fa-
cilitate simultaneous energy and secure information transmis-
sion, a two-phase FD relaying protocol is adopted. As shown
in Fig. 2(a), the source node transmits information signals to
the relay node in the first phase, while in the second phase,
the relay node works in FD mode to forward information
and harvest energy concurrently. To enable FD in the second
1 Note that it is assumed that the direct link between source and destination
(or eavesdropper) does not exist due to the deep shadowing effect in the
transmission scenario [17].
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Fig. 1. System model of the wireless-powered FD relay system, where the
S-ER strategy is employed at the FD relay.
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(b) Time switching architecture for antenna reuse approach at the relay.
Fig. 2. SWIPT model and time switching architecture for antenna reuse
approach at the wireless-powered relay.
phase, a separate antenna configuration is adopted at relay,
i.e., the relay is equipped with one receive antenna and M
transmit antennas. In the first phase, generally only one receive
antenna is used for information reception, while those multiple
transmit antennas are idle. To make full use of all the available
hardware resources (i.e., idle transmit antennas) of relay node
to capture more information, an antenna reuse approach at
the relay node is proposed. The detailed architecture is given
in Fig. 2(b), where M idle transmit antennas are reused for
information reception in the first phase.
With the antenna reuse approach, the received signal at the
relay node during the first phase is written as
yr,1 = H
†
rwsxs + nr, (1)
where yr,1 ∈ C(M+1)×1, wsxs denotes confidential informa-
tion signal transmitted from source node with E{|xs|2} = Ps,
and ws represents the information beamforming vector at the
source node with unit power E{‖ws‖2} = 1. The channel
from source to relay Hr = [hr1,Hr2] is assumed to be
perfectly known to legitimate nodes, where hr1 ∈ CN×1 and
Hr2 ∈ CN×M represent channel coefficients from source to
receive antenna and those transmit antennas at relay, respec-
tively. Moreover, nr denotes the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at relay, i.e., nr ∼ CN (0, N0IM+1).
In the second phase, to enable simultaneous wireless in-
formation and power transfer, the relay node works in FD
mode. Different from traditional FD relaying protocols, the LI
caused by FD operation is beneficial, since it is also a power
source for the energy-constrained relay and enables the relay to
reuse its own transmitted energy. This mode is the previously
described S-ER [29, 31]. Therefore, adopting S-ER protocol
at relay, no extra energy and hardware resources needed any
more to suppress the LI. Moreover, the energy of LI can be
harvested together with the energy signal emitted from the
source, i.e.,
yr,2 = h
†
r1wHxp + f
†wtxr + nr,H . (2)
On the right-hand side of equation (2), the first part is the
energy signal from the source node, where wH denotes the
energy beamformer with E{‖wH‖2} = 1, and xp is the energy
signal emitted from the source with power E{|xp|2} = Ps.
Additionally, the second part represents the LI signal, wherein
f denotes the LI channel between antennas at FD relay and is
normally regarded as Rayleigh fading channel [9, 36]. While
wtxr represents the retransmit signal with E{|xr|2} = Pr,
and wt ∈ CM×1 is the transmit beamforming vector at the
relay with E{‖wt‖2} = 1. Besides, as the energy transmission
between source and relay can be seen as a MISO (Multi-Input
Single-Output) system, MRT (Maximum Ratio Transmission)
is employed as the energy beamformer, i.e., wH =
hr1
‖hr1‖
.
Then, the harvested energy is written as
EH =
T
2
η(|h†r1wH |2Ps + |f†wt|2Pr). (3)
where η is the energy harvesting efficiency, 0 < η ≤ 1,
which depends on the rectification process and the energy
harvesting circuitry [15]. Here, the power of noise (including
both the antenna noise and the rectifier noise) is not taken
into consideration, since it is much smaller than that of energy
signal [37].
The harvested energy at relay will be stored in a battery
for information relaying in the next transmission block. Con-
sidering the long-term time variations, the needed transmit
power at relay is not higher than the harvested power, i.e.,
Pr ≤ η(|h†r1wH |2Ps + |f†wt|2Pr). δ is defined as the power
allocation ratio, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, which denotes δ part of the
harvested energy is allocated for information transmission.
Then the analytical expression of Pr can be expressed as
Pr =
δηPs|h†r1wH |2
1− δη|f†wt|2 . (4)
Assume that a receive beamformer vector,wr ∈ C(M+1)×1,
is employed at relay, the transmit signal will be w†ryr,1.
Employing amplify-and-forward (AF) protocol, the transmit
signal is first amplified by the amplify factor β and pro-
cessed by the transmit beamformer wt ∈ CM×1, and then
forwarded to the destination. Therefore, the processed trans-
mit signal in this phase can be denoted as wtxr , where
xr = βw
†
ryr,1, and the amplify factor is expressed as
β =
√
Pr/(Ps|w†rH†rws|2 +N0).
Finally, the received signal at the destination can be written
as
yd =h
†
dwtxr + nd
=h†dwt
(
βw†rH
†
rwsxs + βw
†
rnr
)
+ nd,
(5)
where hd is the relay-to-destination channel vector, which is
assumed to be perfectly known to legitimate nodes, and nd ∼
CN (0, N0) denotes the noise at destination. Meanwhile, the
received signal at the eavesdropper is expressed as
ye =h
†
ewt
(
βw†rH
†
rwsxs + βw
†
rnr
)
+ ne, (6)
where ne ∼ CN (0, N0) represents the noise at the eaves-
dropper, and he denotes the relay-to-eavesdropper channel
coefficient, which is perfectly known to the eavesdropper but
imperfectly known to those legitimate nodes [38]. Without
loss of generality, the imperfect ECSI is modeled as additive
uncertainty model he = h¯e + ∆he, where h¯e represents the
estimated channel vector of the eavesdropper, ∆he represents
the channel uncertainty. It is assumed that the uncertainty is
deterministically bounded [39], i.e., ‖∆he‖ ≤ ǫ.
B. Problem Formulation
In order to guarantee secrecy for any admissible ECSI
uncertainties, including worst, the worst-case secrecy rate
(WCSR) [33, 39, 40] is adopted as the performance metric,
which is defined as the minimum secrecy rate for any error in
the uncertainty region of the channel,
Rwc = min
‖∆he‖≤ǫ
1
2
[log2(1 + γd)− log2(1 + γe)]+
=
1
2
[log2(1 + γd)− log2(1 + γewc)]+,
(7)
where γd represents the received SINR at the destination and
is expressed as
γd =
Psβ
2|h†dwt|2|w†rH†rws|2
β2|h†dwt|2‖w†r‖2N0 +N0
=
PsPr|h†dwt|2|w†rH†rws|2
PrN0|h†dwt|2 +N0Ps|w†rH†rws|2 +N20
,
(8)
while γewc denotes the maximum SINR the eavesdropper can
get under any channel realization. To obtain the expression
of γewc, the following inequalities associated with imperfect
wiretap channel are first given.
According to triangle inequality and the bound of the
channel uncertainties, the following inequality holds
|(h¯e +∆he)†wt| ≤ |h¯†ewt|+ |∆h†ewt|. (9)
Besides, applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to the sec-
ond term in the right-hand-side of (9), we have
|∆h†ewt| ≤ ‖∆he‖ · ‖wt‖ ≤ ǫ‖wt‖. (10)
Plugging (9) and (10), the following inequality is achieved
|(h¯e +∆he)†wt| ≤ |h¯†ewt|+ ǫ‖wt‖. (11)
Then, γewc can be expressed as
γewc = max
‖∆he‖≤ǫ
PsPr|h
†
ewt|
2|w†rH
†
rws|
2
PrN0|h
†
ewt|2 +N0Ps|w
†
rH
†
rws|2+N20
=
PsPr(|h¯
†
ewt|+ ǫ‖wt‖)
2|w†rH
†
rws|
2
PrN0(|h¯
†
ewt|+ ǫ‖wt‖)2+N0Ps|w
†
rH
†
rws|2+N20
(12)
The detailed analytical expression of WCSR can be obtained
by substituting (8) and (12) into (7).
Finally, with the objective to maximize WCSR performance
through jointly designing the source and relay beamformers
as well as the relay power allocation ratio, the optimization
problem is formulated as
(P1) : max
δ,ws,wr ,wt
Rwc(δ,ws,wr,wt)
s.t.


‖ws‖2 = 1
‖wr‖2 = 1
‖wt‖2 = 1
Pr =
δηPs|h
†
r1
wH |
2
1−δη|f†wt|2
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
. (13)
Since the beamforming vectors ws, wr and wt as well as
the relay power allocation ratio δ are coupled with each other,
it is obvious that the formulated WCSR optimization problem
is non-convex. Hence, the complexity of finding its optimal
solution is prohibitively high. It is even impossible to solve out
these four variables concurrently. As an alternative, to solve it,
the original problem P1 is converted into three subproblems,
which can be solved iteratively.
III. WORST-CASE SECRECY RATE OPTIMIZATION
As mentioned, the formulated optimization problem P1 is
non-convex and difficult to solve. To find out the solutions,
it is proposed to convert the optimization problem into three
subproblems with respect to δ, (ws,wr) and wt, respectively,
based on the fact that both information beamformer and
receive beamformer are coupled with source-to-relay channel
coefficients. By solving the subproblem of power allocation
ratio, the analytical expression of δ⋆(ws,wr,wt) can be
obtained. Substituting it into WCSR in (7), the subproblem
of (ws,wr) can also be solved. Similarly, wt can be derived.
Finally, by substituting the obtained beamformers into the
expression of δ⋆, the power allocation ratio is updated, and
(δ⋆,w⋆s ,w
⋆
r ,w
⋆
t ) for the original problem can be obtained
accordingly.
Before analyzing the secrecy performance, the positive
WCSR constraint is first derived in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If and only if the received information power
at the destination is larger than that at the eavesdropper, i.e.,
|h†dwt|2 > (|h¯†ewt| + ǫ‖wt‖)2, the positive WCSR Rwc > 0
can be achieved.
Proof. The details are given in Appendix A.
A. Power Allocation
From the analytical expression of relay power in (4), it is
easy to know that the power is associated with beamforming
vectors. Therefore, the optimal power allocation scheme is first
investigated. The WCSR optimization problem with respect to
power allocation ratio δ is expressed as
(P2.1) : max
δ
Rwc(δ)
s.t.

 Pr =
δηPs|h
†
r1
wH |
2
1−δη|f†wt|2
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 . (14)
In order to get the optimal power allocation ratio, the following
Proposition 2 is proposed.
Proposition 2. With the positive WCSR constraint, the opti-
mal solution of relay power allocation ratio is
δ⋆ =
{
1
η|f†wt|2+Q
, C1 or C2 or C3
1, otherwise
(15)
where
Q = ηPs|h†r1wH |2
√
|h†dwt|2(|h¯†ewt|+ ǫ‖wt‖)2
N0Ps|w†rH†rws|2 +N20
. (16)
The constraints in (15) are denoted as C1 = {0 < Q <
1, η|f†wt|2 > max(Q, 1 − Q)}, C2 = {Q > 12 , 1 − Q <
η|f†wt|2 < min(1, Q)}, and C3 = { 12 < Q < 1, η|f†wt|2 =
Q}, respectively .
Proof. See Appendix B.
After obtaining the optimal power allocation ratio δ⋆
through Proposition 2, the optimal transmit power at the relay
can be written as
P ⋆r =


√
N0Ps|w
†
rH
†
rws|2+N20
|h†
d
wt|2(|h¯
†
ewt|+ǫ‖wt‖)2
, C1 or C2 or C3
ηPs|h
†
r1
wH |
2
1−η|f†wt|2
, otherwise
.
(17)
B. Information and Receive Beamforming Design
In expressions of γd and γewc, the source information
beamformer and relay receive beamformer are always coupled
with the source-to-relay channel coefficients, i.e. |w†rH†rws|2.
Based on the obtained optimal power allocation ratio δ⋆,
these two beamformers can be jointly designed by maximizing
WCSR
(P2.2) : max
ws,wr
Rwc(ws,wr)
s.t.


‖ws‖
2 = 1
‖wr‖
2 = 1
δ = δ⋆
. (18)
For finding out the optimal solution of P2.2, the following
proposition is proposed.
Proposition 3. For any value of power allocation ratio δ⋆,
only if the maximum value of |w†rH†rws|2 is achieved the
WCSR performance can be maximized.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Consequently, the problem P2.2 is equivalent to maximize
|w†rH†rws|2 under power constraints, i.e.,
(P2.2.1) : max
ws,wr
|w†rH†rws|2
s.t.
{ ‖ws‖2 = 1
‖wr‖2 = 1 . (19)
Doing singular value decomposition (SVD) of H†r, we have
H†r = UΣV
†, where Σ ∈ R(M+1)×N is a rectangular diag-
onal matrix, whose diagonal entries σi are known as singular
values of H†r. Both U ∈ C(M+1)×(M+1) and V ∈ CN×N
are unitary matrices, the columns of U and the columns of
V are left-singular vectors and right-singular vectors of H†r,
respectively. Based on the SVD properties of matrix H†r, the
optimal solution of problem P2.2.1 can be obtained
(w⋆s ,w
⋆
r) =
(
vunit,uunit
)
, (20)
where vunit and uunit are the right-singular vector and the
left-singular vector corresponding to the largest singular value,
with ‖uunit‖2 = 1, ‖vunit‖2 = 1. Since problems P2.2 and
P2.2.1 are equivalent, the solution in (20) is also the optimal
solution of the original problem P2.2.
C. Relay Transmit Beamforming Design
After obtaining the optimal information beamformer, the
optimal receive beamformer as well as the optimal power
allocation ratio, the original WCSR optimization problem P1
is simplified to be a function of the transmit beamformer
wt. To degrade the information leakage and null out the
confidential signals at the eavesdropper, zero-forcing (ZF)
beamforming is adopted, i.e., h¯†ewt = 0. Hence, the WCSR
optimization problem with respect to wt is reformulated as
(P2.3) : max
wt
Rwc(wt)
s.t.


h¯
†
ewt = 0
‖wt‖
2 = 1
(ws,wr) = (w
⋆
s ,w
⋆
r)
δ = δ⋆
. (21)
To facilitate ZF beamforming design, a matrix B is defined to
accommodate the orthogonal vectors that form the basis of the
null space of h¯†e, i.e., the right singular vectors corresponding
to zero singular values of h¯†e. Thereby, wt is designed as
a linear combination of the basis of the null space of h¯†e,
i.e., w⋆t = Bv, where v is a column vector. As the optimal
δ⋆ in a piecewise expression, the solution of the transmit
beamforming vector also has two possibilities, which are
analyzed in the following.
1) Part of harvested energy for information transmission:
For δ⋆ = 1/(η|f†wt|2 + Q), the received SINRs at the
destination and eavesdropper can be rewritten as
γd =
Ps|w†rH†rws|2|h†dBv|
N0|h†dBv|+ ǫ‖Bv‖
√
N0Ps|w†rH†rws|2 +N20
, (22)
γe =
Ps|w†rH†rws|2ǫ‖Bv‖
N0ǫ‖Bv‖+ |h†dBv|
√
(N0Psw
†
rH
†
rws|2+N20 )
. (23)
It is obvious that γd is an increasing function of
|h†dBv|/ǫ‖Bv‖, while γe is a decreasing function of that.
Therefore, the WCSR maximization problem P2.3 is equiva-
lent to maximizing the ratio of |h†dBv|2 and ǫ2‖Bv‖2, i.e.,
(P2.3.1) : max
v
v†B†hdh
†
dBv
ǫ2v†B†Bv
s.t. v†B†Bv = 1. (24)
The objective function of (24) is a generalized eigenvector
problem, and the solution of which is associated with the
eigenvector of the matrix 1
ǫ2
B†hdh
†
dB [6, 10]. Let q
unit
1 be
the unit-norm eigenvector of this matrix corresponding to its
maximum eigenvalue, we have v⋆ = µ1q
unit
1 , where µ1 is a
scalar determined by the power constraint, and is equal to
µ1 =
√
1
(qunit1 )
†B†Bqunit1
. (25)
Substituting v⋆ into (15), if one of the constraints C1, C2
or C3 is satisfied, the optimal transmit beamforming vector
can be obtained
w⋆t =
√
1
(qunit1 )
†B†Bqunit1
Bqunit1 . (26)
Otherwise, w⋆t should be solved in the following part.
2) All harvested energy for information transmission: For
δ⋆ = 1, the optimization problem of WCSR can be readily
formulated as
(P2.3.2) : max
v
v†R˜fEv
v†R˜fDv
· v
†R˜RDv
v†R˜REv
s.t. v†B†Bv = 1, (27)
where matrices RRD = ηP
2
s |h†r1wH |2|w†rH†rws|2B†hdh†dB,
R˜fD = (N0Ps|w†rH†rws|2 + N20 )(B†B − ηB†ff †B) +
ηPsN0|h†r1wH |2B†hdh†dB, and R˜RD = RRD + R˜fD. Sim-
ilarly, matrices RRE = ηP
2
s |h†r1wH |2|w†rH†rws|2ǫ2B†B,
R˜fE = (N0Ps|w†rH†rws|2 + N20 )(B†B − ηB†ff †B) +
ηPsN0|h†r1wH |2ǫ2B†B, and R˜RE = RRE + R˜fE .
Since both R˜fD and R˜fE are diagonal matrices, the objec-
tive function of P2.3.2 is a product of two correlated general-
ized eigenvector problems, which is in general intractable [6].
To simplify the analysis and solve the problem, a suboptimal
solution is proposed to maximize the upper and lower bounds
of the objective function of (27).
As it is known, the maximum value and the minimum
value of the ratio v†R˜fEv/v
†R˜fDv are corresponding to the
maximum eigenvalue λmax and the minimum eigenvalue λmin
of the matrix R˜−1fDR˜fE , respectively. Therefore, the lower and
upper bounds of the objective function can be written as
λmin
v†R˜RDv
v†R˜REv
≤ v
†R˜fEv
v†R˜fDv
· v
†R˜RDv
v†R˜REv
≤ λmaxv
†R˜RDv
v†R˜REv
,
(28)
in which the analytical expressions of λmax and λmin are
given on the top of next page.
With the given λmax and λmin, the solution of v maximiz-
ing the lower or upper bound in (28) is also the solution of
the generalized eigenvector problem v†R˜RDv/v
†R˜REv, i.e.,
v⋆ = µ2q
unit
2 , wherein q
unit
2 is the unit-norm eigenvector of
matrix R˜−1RER˜RD corresponding to its maximum eigenvalue,
and µ2 is a scalar chosen to satisfy the power constraint,
µ2 =
√
1/[(qunit2 )
†B†Bqunit2 ].
Remark 1. The above suboptimal solution works well when
λmax ≈ λmin. Based on (29) and (30), λmax ≈ λmin holds
if the signal power at the relay is much greater than that
at the destination and eavesdropper, i.e., Ps|w†rH†rws|2 ≫
ηPs|h
†
r1
wH |
2
1−η|f(i)|2 |hd(i)|2 and Ps|w†rH†rws|2 ≫
ηPs|h
†
r1
wH |
2
1−η|f(i)|2 ǫ
2 for
i = 1, 2, . . . ,M . Since in this case, the bounds in (28) are tight
and the solution w⋆t = µ2Bq
unit
2 that maximizes the bounds
of WCSR is near-optimal. If λmax ≈ λmin does not hold, the
above method may not perform well and the other suboptimal
method proposed in the following could be used instead.
• Given an information leakage threshold ( 12 log2(1 +
γewc) ≤ γ0), the information rate maximization problem
at destination can be formulated as
(P2.3.3) : max
v
v†R˜RDv
v†R˜fDv
s.t.
{
v†B†f†fBv ≤ g(ǫ)
v†B†Bv = 1
. (31)
where
g(ǫ) =
1
η
− Ps|h
†
r1wH |2ǫ2
Ps|w†rH†rws|2+N0
(
Ps|w†rH†rws|2
N0(22γ0 − 1) −1
)
.
(32)
To solve the above problem, an extra coefficient
ζ ∈ [0, 1] is introduced and used to form the in-
equality constraint in (31) as an equality constraint,
v†B†f†fBv = ζg(ǫ). By substituting the reformed
inequality constraint and the other equality constraint
into the objective function, the optimization problem
P2.3.3 can be rewritten as a generalized eigenvector
problem. Then, the optimal v⋆ = µ3q
unit
3 is obtained,
where qunit3 is the unit-norm eigenvector of the ma-
trix Rˆ−1fDRˆRD corresponding to its maximum eigen-
value, in which RˆfD = ηPsN0|h†r1wH |2B†hdh†dB +
(N0Ps|w†rH†rws|2 +N20 )(1− ηζg(ǫ))B†B and RˆRD =
RRD + RˆfD. µ3 in the solution is a scalar guaranteeing
the power constraint, and µ3 =
√
1/[(qunit3 )
†B†Bqunit3 ].
In addition, the optimal value of the introduced coefficient
ζ can be obtained by bisection method. Finally, the
optimal solution of transmit beamformer is derived to be
w⋆t = µ3Bq
unit
3 .
λmax = max
i
(
ηPs|h†r1wH |2ǫ2 + (Ps|w†rH†rws|2 +N0)(1− η|f(i)|2)
ηPs|h†r1wH |2|hd(i)|2 + (Ps|w†rH†rws|2 +N0)(1 − η|f(i)|2)
)
, (29)
λmin = min
i
(
ηPs|h†r1wH |2ǫ2 + (Ps|w†rH†rws|2 +N0)(1 − η|f(i)|2)
ηPs|h†r1wH |2|hd(i)|2 + (Ps|w†rH†rws|2 +N0)(1− η|f(i)|2)
)
. (30)
D. WCSR Optimization Algorithm Description
With the obtained transmit beamformer at relay, the power
allocation ratio can be updated. Since wr and ws are only
associated with the source-to-relay channel coefficients, they
are proved to have no change in Proposition 3. Consequently,
to maximize WCSR, we can first calculate the optimal infor-
mation and receive beamformers, and then achieve the transmit
beamformer and power allocation ratio iteratively. The whole
process of WCSR optimization is summarized in the following
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Worst-Case Secrecy Rate Optimization
1: Do SVD decomposition of the source-to-relay channel
matrix Hr, H
†
r = UΣV
†.
2: Find out the largest singular value from Σ, and get
its corresponding right-singular vector and left-singular
vector |uunit‖2 = 1, ‖vunit‖2 = 1.
3: Get the optimal (w⋆s ,w
⋆
r) =
(
vunit,uunit
)
.
4: Calculate the transmit beamforming vector w⋆t based on
equation (26).
5: Check whether one of constraints C1, C2 and C3 is
satisfied with the obtained w⋆t .
6: if C1|C2|C3 then
7: The power allocation ratio δ⋆ = 1/(η|f†w⋆t |2 +Q).
8: else
9: The power allocation ratio δ⋆ = 1. w⋆t is calculated by
using methods proposed in Section III-C-2.
10: end if
11: Calculate Rwc(δ
⋆,w⋆s ,w
⋆
r ,w
⋆
t ).
It should be noted that since (δ⋆,w⋆s ,w
⋆
r ,w
⋆
t ) of P1 is
obtained iteratively, the optimality of them depends on the
optimality of the obtained transmit beamformer. If the transmit
beamformer w⋆t in (26) can be achieved, the final solution is
optimal for the original problem P1. Otherwise, the obtained
solution is suboptimal.
IV. TIME SWITCHING BASED RELAYING
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Fig. 3. Time switching based wireless powered relaying system model.
TSR secure system [29, 41] is included as a benchmark for
performance comparisons. The secure communication based
on TSR protocol consists of three phases, as shown in Fig. 3.
One phase for energy harvesting and the other two phases for
information transmission from source to destination with the
help of a HD relay. Using TSR, the received SINR at the
destination is expressed as
γTSRd =
PsPr|h†dwt|2|h†r1ws|2
PrN0|h†dwt|2 + PsN0|h†r1ws|2 +N20
, (33)
where Pr denotes transmit power at the relay, Pr =
δ 2α1−αηPs|h†r1wH |2, and δ is defined as the power allocation
ratio, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Additionally, beamformers ws and wH
are both designed based on MRT, i.e., ws =
hr1
‖hr1‖
and
wH =
hr1
‖hr1‖
.
The received SINR at the eavesdropper can be expressed as
γTSRewc =
PsPr(|h¯†ewt|+ ǫ‖wt‖)2|h†r1ws|2
PrN0(|h¯†ewt|+ǫ‖wt‖)2+PsN0|h†r1ws|2+N20
.
(34)
Then, the WCSR for TSR secure systems is expressed as
Rwc =
1− α
2
[log2(1 + γ
TSR
d )− log2(1 + γTSRewc )]+. (35)
Finally, the WCSR maximization problem is formulated as
(P3) : max
α,δ,wt
Rwc(α, δ,wt)
s.t.


Pr = 2δPs
ηα
1−α |h†r1wH |2
‖wt‖2 = 1
0 < α < 1
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
. (36)
It is obvious that the transmit beamformer wt and the
power allocation ratio δ as well as the TS coefficient α are
coupled with each other, and the above problem is non-convex.
To solve problem P3 effectively, an iterative algorithm is
summarized in Algorithm 2.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, to validate the accuracy and effectiveness
of the theoretical results developed in previous sections and
evaluate WCSR performance of the wireless-powered relay
system with S-ER, Monte Carlo simulations are done. All
the simulation results are obtained by averaging over 104
independent trials. Unless otherwise specified, the source has
five antennas (N = 5), while the wireless-powered relay
is equipped with four antennas, in which one antenna is
used for information reception and energy harvesting, the
other three antennas (M = 3) used for both information
transmission and reception. Without loss of generality, the
Algorithm 2 Iterative Algorithm for WCSR Optimization
1: Initialize ws =
hr1
‖hr1‖
, wH =
hr1
‖hr1‖
, w0t , α
0, δ0, ε,
calculate Rwc(w
0
t , α
0, δ0), and set n = 0.
2: repeat
3: n = n+ 1
4: For the fixed wn−1t , α
n−1, find δn using Lemma 1
proposed in [25].
5: With δn and fixed αn−1, calculate wnt using an ap-
proach similar to Section III-C.
6: For the obtained δn and wnt , find the numerical so-
lution of αn, and calculate the secrecy rate Rnwc =
Rwc(w
n
t , α
n, δn).
7: until |Rnwc −Rn−1wc | ≤ ε.
8: return (w⋆t , α
⋆, δ⋆) = (wnt , α
n, δn)
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Fig. 4. WCSR versus the level of bounded uncertainty region of ECSI with
different number of transmit antennas at the relay M = [2, 3, 4]. Additionally,
the information leakage threshold is set to be γ0 = 10−6 bits/s/Hz.
source-relay distance and the relay-destination distance are
both normalized to unit value [16], and the relay-eavesdropper
distance dre is set to be 1.2drd. All channels are assumed to be
Rayleigh fading channels, and the mean value of each channel
coefficient is associated with the distance between two nodes,
i.e., σ2s = d
−m
sr , σ
2
d = d
−m
rd and σ
2
e = d
−m
re , in which the path
loss exponent is set to be m = 3. Besides, the mean value
of LI channel coefficient ‖f‖2 is set to be λf = 0.2, and the
energy harvesting efficiency η = 0.8.
A. Uncertainty Region of ECSI
In a multi-antenna secure system, it is generally known that
the secure beamformer design depends on the availability of
CSI, especially the CSI of wiretap channels. If the source and
the relay have only partial ECSI, there is a high probability
in information leakage at the eavesdropper, finally leading to
WCSR loss. Thus, in order to show how important it is to take
imperfect ECSI into account for secure beamformer design, the
WCSR performance versus the uncertainty region of ECSI is
simulated. Results are shown in Fig. 4 and reveal that the
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Fig. 5. WCSR performance versus the ratio between the actual transmit
power and the harvested power at the relay, i.e., δ = Pr/PH , where PH is
the harvested power at the relay, PH =
EH
T/2
.
increase of the level of the bounded eavesdropper channel
uncertainty has destructive effect on the system performance.
That is because this makes the secure beamformer design
inefficient, leading to more information leakage to the eaves-
dropper, finally resulting in substantial WCSR degradation. In
addition, results also show that compared with the scheme
exploiting only one receive antenna for information reception
(i.e., Nr = 1), the antenna reuse scheme (i.e., Nr = M + 1)
achieves better WCSR performance. Intuitively, this is because
more spatial degrees of freedom offered by reusing transmit
antenna elements facilitate the information reception, enhance
the received signal strength at relay. This results in an increase
of received information rate at the destination, hence brings
more WCSR gains. Moreover, putting more antennas at relay
M = [2, 3, 4] would also offer more spatial degrees of freedom
for information retransmission, and consequently improve the
system WCSR. This is rather intuitive, since more antennas
result in sharper information beams, which in turn yield higher
secrecy performance.
B. Power Allocation
As analyzed in Section III, due to the presence of the
eavesdropper node, using the harvested energy fully for in-
formation transmission has both constructive and destructive
effects on the system performance. The increase of transmit
power at the relay helps information retransmission, and
consequently improves the received SINR at the destination.
Meanwhile, increasing the transmit power at relay also en-
hances the information strength at eavesdropper, resulting in
more information leakage. Hence, there exists an optimal
power allocation strategy at relay maximizing the WCSR
performance. To illustrate the effects of power allocation
strategy on secrecy performance and demonstrate the ac-
curacy of the derived optimal power allocation ratio solu-
tion in Proposition 1, the WCSR performance with different
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
λf
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
W
or
st
-C
as
e 
Se
cr
ec
y 
Ra
te
 (b
its
/s/
Hz
)
ǫ=0.001, N
r
=M+1, S-ER
ǫ=0.05, N
r
=M+1, S-ER
ǫ=0.001, N
r
=1, S-ER
ǫ=0.05, N
r
=1, S-ER
ǫ=0.001, N
r
=1, TSR
ǫ=0.05, N
r
=1, TSR
S-ER
TSR
Fig. 6. WCSR performance versus the strength of LI for the proposed S-ER
based secure system and traditional TSR secure system. The eavesdropper
channel uncertainty region is set to be ǫ = [0.001, 0.05].
power allocation ratio is simulated. In doing so, we focus
on a single transmission block with the following randomly
generated channel coefficients: the source-to-relay channel
hr1 = [−0.9693 + 0.4571i,−1.4266 + 0.3548i,−1.8713 +
0.8418i, 0.7243− 0.0702i,−0.9796+ 0.3818i]T , and
Hr2=


0.5023+0.9428i 1.0247−0.7866i −0.2742+0.7717i
0.0555−0.5340i −1.5941−0.4515i −0.1950−0.1796i
−0.7962+0.9197i −1.0882−0.2271i 0.3783−0.5202i
1.0129−1.0110i −1.1428−0.3521i −0.0615−0.2866i
0.0170+1.3779i −1.2486−0.0870i 0.1937−1.1660i


.
It is also assumed that the LI channel f = [−0.6791 +
0.0424i, 0.5303 + 0.1144i,−0.5517 − 0.0069i]T , while
the relay-to-destination channel hd = [−0.5039 +
0.3520i, 0.4230− 1.1293i, 0.6480+ 1.6376i]T , and the relay-
to-eavesdropper channel h¯e = [0.6417 − 0.3991i, 0.1765 −
0.9396i,−0.5278 − 0.8778i]T . All the above channel coef-
ficients are randomly generalized following their statistical
properties. With different levels of bounded eavesdropper
channel uncertainty ǫ = [0.001, 0.05, 0.1], the WCSR per-
formance versus the ratio between the actual transmit power
and the harvested power at the relay is included in Fig. 5.
It is shown that the simulation results are highly coherent
with the theoretical solutions obtained in Proposition 1, and
there exists an optimal power allocation ratio maximizing
WCSR. Moreover, results also verify that compared with
MRT beamforming design method, i.e., w⋆t =
hd
‖hd‖
, the
proposed robust ZF beamforming method can considerably
reduce the effects caused by the channel uncertainty on the
system secrecy, and offers higher WCSR gain.
C. Key Parameters
In a S-ER based wireless-powered secure relay system, the
strength of LI channel determines how much amount of inter-
ference energy the relay can recycle and reuse for information
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Fig. 7. WCSR performance versus energy harvesting efficiency for both S-ER
based secure systems and TSR secure systems. The strength of LI channel is
set to be λf = 0.2.
retransmission. Therefore, it is a key parameter determining
the superiority of the secrecy performance. Fig. 6 shows the
WCSR performance of both S-ER based secure system and
TSR system when the strength of LI channel is different.
Contrary to traditional FD relaying systems, the LI does not
interfere information transmission, but brings another energy
resource at relay to support information relaying. Therefore, as
shown in Fig. 6, increasing λf leads to an increase of WCSR
performance of the proposed S-ER based secure systems.
While, the secrecy rate remains a constant because there is no
interference in TSR systems. Since a novel energy resource (LI
energy) is introduced by the FD operation at the relay in S-ER
based system, its secrecy performance is significantly boosted
compared with TSR systems. Even setting λf = 0, in S-ER
based systems, more WCSR gain can be obtained through
simultaneous information transmission and energy harvesting
strategy than in TSR systems. Specifically, with fixed eaves-
dropper channel uncertainty ǫ = 0.001, the proposed S-ER
based secure system achieves more than 38%− 80% WCSR
gain compared with TSR system for both Nr = M + 1 and
Nr = 1. With more higher eavesdropper channel uncertainty
ǫ = 0.05, the proposed S-ER based secure system can also
offer 36% − 65% rate gain. Moreover, since LI brings extra
energy resource at relay instead of harmful interference for
information transmission, the relay does not have to spend
extra energy or other communication resources to suppress
it. This makes it possible for S-ER based secure systems
to benefit from significant secrecy performance improvement
without no extra resource consumptions.
As illustrated in Fig. 6, the strength of LI channel and the
energy conversion efficiency factor η determine how much
energy the relay can actually harvest from energy signals
emitted by the source node and interference signals caused
by LI channel. Higher energy conversion efficiency allows
wireless-powered relay to harvest more energy from energy
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Fig. 8. WCSR performance for different source-relay distance dsr =
[0.5, 1, 1.5]. Without loss of generality, the strength of LI channel is set to
be λf = 0.2, and the energy harvesting efficiency is set to be η = 0.8.
signals, which in turn enhances the received information rate
at the destination, finally improves the WCSR performance
substantially, as shown in Fig. 7. Nevertheless, as the har-
vested energy increased along with η, it also leads to more
serious information leakage, eventually results in the secrecy
performance increasing slowly in high η regime. Additionally,
simulation results also show that the WCSR gap between the
proposed S-ER based systems and TSR systems is more than
0.7 bits/s/Hz in high η regime, which is about 40% rate gain. It
indicates that with the introduced LI as extra energy resource
for the wireless-powered relay node, the S-ER based system
achieves much better WCSR performance than TSR systems.
The location of relay can also impact on the received
information rate at receivers (including both destination and
eavesdropper nodes). Therefore, the relay layout is of great
importance in the cooperative wireless-powered systems [16,
25]. In this part, the WCSR performance for different relay
locations is also simulated and investigated, and results are
included in Fig. 8. Results show that with the eavesdropper
channel uncertainty, the wireless-powered relay located near
to the source or the destination offers optimal secrecy perfor-
mance. The reason is that the relay node is solely powered
by the source. In low ǫ regime, when the relay is located
near to the source, it can harvest more energy for information
relaying and hence improves WCSR performance. While in
high ǫ regime, excessive amount of energy harvested at relay
will lead to serious information leakage, and results in high
secrecy performance loss. Therefore, in this case, the relay
located near the source does not bring more performance gain
but serious performance loss. On the contrary, the wireless-
powered relay approaching to the destination can obtain better
WCSR performance. Since when the relay node located near
the destination, the required relay power to achieve the infor-
mation transmission from relay to destination is also reduced,
the destination can still achieve better performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work investigated robust secure beamforming design
and relay power allocation of a wireless-powered relay sys-
tem with imperfect ECSI. For efficient energy transfer and
information relaying, a two-phase FD relaying protocol was
investigated, in which the S-ER enabled relay recycles LI
energy and utilizes the gathered energy for information re-
laying. Adopting the worst-case deterministic ECSI model,
the WCSR optimization problem was formulated by jointly
designing source and relay beamformers coupled with power
allocation ratio. As the formulated problem is non-convex, an
alternative method has been proposed to solve it more effi-
ciently. Through converting the original optimization problem
into three subproblems and solving them iteratively, the closed
form solutions of the optimal source information beamformer,
receive beamformer and transmit beamformer of the relay as
well as optimal power allocation ratio were derived theoreti-
cally. Additionally, for comparison, the WCSR performance
of TSR system has been included and analyzed. Intensive
simulations have been done, and results have validated the
effectiveness of the proposed iterative method and the accuracy
of the derived variables. Results also have revealed that the
proposed S-ER based secure system outperforms TSR system
significantly. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that since the
proposed antenna reuse scheme can capture more information,
it boosts the WCSR performance substantially when compared
with schemes exploiting only one receive antenna.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
According to the definition of WCSR in (7), Rwc > 0
is equivalent to γd > γewc, i.e., the received SINR at the
destination is larger than that at the eavesdropper.
Based on the expressions of γd and γewc in equation (8) and
(12), it is easy to know that both of them can be formulated
in the form of g(y) = c1y/(c2y + c3), where y denotes the
channel condition, |h†dwt|2 or (|h¯†ewt| + ǫ‖wt‖)2. It can be
proved that g(y) is a monotonically increasing function of y.
Consequently, if and only if |h†dwt|2 is larger than (|h¯†ewt|+
ǫ‖wt‖)2, the received SINR at the destination is larger than
the received SINR at the eavesdropper. The positive secrecy
rate is achieved and the security of information transmission is
guaranteed. Otherwise, the secrecy rate will be non-positive.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
The secrecy rate is the function of power allocation ratio δ.
For analysis simplicity, introducing x, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, to substitute
δ, the rate can be formulated as a function f(x)
f(x) =
1
2
(
log2(1 +
a1x
a2x+ 1
)− log2(1 +
a3x
a4x+ 1
)
)
,
(37)
where parameters a1, a2, a3 and a4 are expressed as
a1 =
ηP 2s |h†dwt|2|w†rH†rws|2|h†r1wH |2
N0Ps|w†rH†rw2s +N20
,
a2 =
ηPsN0|h†dwt|2|h†r1wH |2
N0Ps|w†rH†rws|2 +N20
− η|f†wt|2,
a3 =
ηP 2s (|h¯†ewt|+ ǫ‖wt‖)2|w†rH†rws|2|h†r1wH |2
N0Ps|w†rH†rws|2 +N20
,
a4 =
ηPsN0(|h¯†ewt|+ ǫ‖wt‖)2|h†r1wH |2
N0Ps|w†rH†rws|2 +N20
− η|f†wt|2.
It is obvious that a1 > 0, a3 > 0. Moreover, under the positive
secrecy rate constraint proved in Proposition 1, we have a1 >
a3, a2 > a4.
The derivative of f(x) is expressed as
df(x)
dx
=
1
ln 2
(
(a1a
2
4 − a
2
2a3) + a1a3(a4 − a2)
)
x2
(1+a1x+a2x)(1+a2x)(1+a3x+a4x)(1+a4x)
+
1
ln 2
2(a1a4−a2a3)x+ a1 − a3
(1+a1x+a2x)(1+a2x)(1+a3x+a4x)(1+a4x)
.
As the denominator of df(x)/dx is always positive for x ≥ 0,
the sign of the numerator polynomial of df(x)/dx
h(x) =
(
(a1a
2
4 − a22a3) + a1a3(a4 − a2)
)
x2
+ 2(a1a4 − a2a3)x + a1 − a3,
(38)
determines the monotonicity and optimality of f(x). Defining
A = (a1a
2
4 − a22a3) + a1a3(a4 − a2), B = 2(a1a4 − a2a3),
C = a1 − a3, we have B < 0, C > 0, h(0) = C > 0 and
∆ = 4a1a3(a2 − a4)(a1 + a2 − a3 − a4) > 0. It means that
there are two roots for h(x) = 0. In the following, the sign of
h(x) is analyzed.
1) For A > 0, i.e., η|f†wt|2 > Q. Based on Vieta theory, it
is easy to prove that there are two positive roots for h(x) = 0,
and one of them is larger than 1. Therefore, two cases of the
sign of h(1) =
(
1− η|f†wt|2
)2 −Q2 should be analyzed.
Case i) For h(1) ≥ 0, we have Q < η|f†wt|2 ≤ 1−Q and
Q < 12 . In this case, both two roots are no less than x = 1. So,
the sign of h(x) is always positive in the interval 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
That is, the function f(x) is monotonically increasing with
respect to 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and the optimal solution is x⋆ = 1.
Case ii) For h(1) < 0, we have η|f†wt|2 > max(Q, 1−Q)
and 0 < Q < 1. In this case, one root is larger than x = 1
and the other one is less than x = 1, i.e., the sign of h(x) is
changed from positive to negative. Thus f(x) is concave, and
the optimal solution equals to
x⋆ =
1
η|f†wt|2 +Q (39)
2) For A ≤ 0, i.e., η|f†wt|2 ≤ Q. Based on Vieta theory,
it is easy to prove that there are one positive root and one
negative root for h(x) = 0, and the absolute value of the
negative root is larger than the positive one, thus h(x) is
monotonically decreasing in the interval 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Case i) h(1) ≥ 0, we have η|f†wt|2 ≤ min(Q, 1 − Q)
and 0 < Q < 1. Since h(0) > 0, h(1) ≥ 0 and h(x) is
monotonically decreasing, then we have h(x) ≥ 0. Therefore,
the function f(x) is monotonically increasing for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
and the optimal solution is x⋆ = 1.
Case ii) For h(1) = 0, we have η|f†wt|2 = 1 − Q and
1
2 < Q < 1. In this case, with the condition h(0) > 0, it
is easy to prove that h(x) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, i.e., the
function f(x) is monotonically increasing in 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and
the optimal solution is x⋆ = 1.
Case iii) For h(1) < 0, when A < 0, we have 1 − Q <
η|f†wt|2 < min(1, Q) and Q > 12 , and when A = 0, we
have η|f†wt|2 = Q and 12 < Q < 1. Specially, when A < 0,
the positive root is less than x = 1, i.e., the sign of h(x)
is changed from positive to negative. That is to say f(x) is
concave, and the optimal solution is the same as in equation
(39). Alternatively, when A = 0, h(x) has only one positive
root and less than x = 1. Thus, similarly with A < 0 case,
f(x) is also concave, and the optimal solution is (39).
Consequently, combining case ii) in part 1) and case iii)
in part 2), for constraints C1 = {0 < Q < 1, η|f†wt|2 >
max(Q, 1 − Q)}, or C2 = {Q > 12 , 1 − Q < η|f†wt|2 <
min(1, Q)}, or C3 = { 12 < Q < 1, η|f†wt|2 = Q}, the
function f(x) is concave, and the optimal solution is derived as
(39). Otherwise, the function f(x) is monotonically increasing
in 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and the optimal solution is x⋆ = 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
As the source information beamformer and the relay receive
beamformer always appear together with the source-to-relay
channel coefficients in a form of production, the WCSR
performance with respect to |w†rH†rws|2 is investigated. Since
the solution of the optimal power allocation ratio δ⋆ in a
piecewise expression, two cases should be analyzed.
1) For δ⋆ = 1
η|f†wt|2+Q
, the received SINRs at the receive
nodes (destination and eavesdropper) are expressed as
γd =
Ps|w†rH†rws|2|h†dwt|
N0|h†dwt|+(|h¯†ewt|+ǫ‖wt‖)
√
N0Ps|w†rH†rws|2+N20
,
γewc =
Ps|w†rH†rws|2(|h¯†ewt|+ ǫ‖wt‖)
N0(|h¯†ewt|+ǫ‖wt‖)+|h†dwt|
√
N0Ps|w†rH†rws|2+N20
.
With the definition of x = |w†rH†rws|2, and g(x) =√
Psx+N0, the WCSR can be formed as a function of x
f(x) = log2
(
a1g(x) + ca2
a2g(x) + ca1
)
, (40)
where c =
√
N0, a1 = |h†dwt|, a2 = |h¯†ewt| + ǫ‖wt‖. The
derivative function is expressed as
df(x)
dx
=
1
ln 2
ca2(a1 − a2)
(a1g(x) + ca2)(a2g(x) + ca1)
dg(x)
dx
. (41)
As the denominator of (41) is always positive for x ≥ 0, the
sign of df(x)/dx is determined by the sign of its numerator.
It is obvious that g(x) is an increasing function of x, then we
have the sign of its derivative function is positive, dg(x)/dx >
0. Additionally, under the positive WCSR constraint, a1 > a2
always holds. Therefore, df(x)/dx is always greater than zero,
and f(x) is a monotonically increasing function of x ≥ 0.
2) For δ⋆ = 1, the WCSR can be formed as the following
function
h(x) =
1
2
log2
(
b1x
b2x+ 1
)
− 1
2
log2
(
b3x
b4x+ 1
)
. (42)
On the basis of Lemma 1 proposed in [25], it is easily proved
that h(x) is also an increasing function of x.
Consequently, for any value of power allocation ratio δ⋆, the
WCSR is a monotonically increasing function of |w†rH†rws|2,
and only if the maximum value of |w†rH†rws|2 is achieved,
the WCSR performance can be maximized.
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